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The managers’ moment in Western politics: the popularization of
management and its effects in the 1980s and 1990s
Ronald Kroezea* and Sjoerd Keulenb
aHistory Department, Faculty of Arts, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;
bHistory Department, Faculty of Humanities, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
In the 1980s and 1990s, political leaders in Western democracies used management and
managerialism to initiate change. The result was privatization, deregulation, public
cost-cutting programs and a greater influence of business leaders and managerial
principles in politics and public administration. This change was possible because
management itself had transformed from a systems approach to a more personal
approach, which made the manager the symbolic figurehead of organizational change
and success. Management and rock star CEOs became a big hit in popular culture.
An in-depth analysis of the Dutch case shows that political leaders explicitly and
purposely presented themselves as managers and were perceived as such. These
‘managers in politics’, (prime) ministers and chairmen of political parties transformed
their organizations in a managerial way. By focusing on Dutch environmental policy,
we establish that this transformation effected the content of environmental
policy. Around 2000, the manager steadily lost his/her attractiveness as he/she was
held responsible for economic decline and governmental problems. A new political
language, influenced by the experiences with management in the 1980s and 1990s, was
introduced. Entrepreneurship instead of managerialism, value-driven politics instead of
‘no nonsense’ business talk and ‘emotional’ instead of ‘rational’ management models
became popular. This article thus argues that more attention should be paid to the
historical change of management in the 1980s and 1990s; that this change should be
understood as a linguistic change first that, however, initiated a change of practices; and
that concentrating on politics, public administration and popular culture provides a new
understanding of the kind of management change that took place.
Keywords: leadership; management in popular culture; managerialism; managers in
politics; new public management
Introduction
In the 1980s and 1990s, some well-known political leaders were called ‘managers’ in
Western Europe. They were very proud of their nickname, as Ruud Lubbers, Dutch Prime
Minister from 1982 until 1994, stressed:
I was a manager in politics. At the time “manager” implied, and this was also often written,
“that man has no political ideals, he is just a manager”. But I wanted a different Netherlands –
dynamics, individualization, modernization. It was a journalistic typology of course, but I also
considered it a title of honour, because at least you managed something, you got things done.
That was the managing dimension, and it has taken me far. (Lubbers in Keulen and Kroeze
2011, 44)
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So far, little attention has been paid to the rise of the manager in politics, either in
management studies or in political history. The manager’s moment in Western politics,
however, provides an opportunity to analyze a crucial change in the history of
management: the period of popularization and individualization of management in the
1980s and 1990s, and its effect on public organizations and policymaking.
The topic of this article lies at the intersection of management history on the one hand,
and contemporary and political history on the other. The latter two tell us that ideas and
practices to effectively govern the public sector have been influenced by experts,
management scholars and businessmen in the decades before and after the Second World
War (e.g. Nu¨tzenadel 2005; Couperus 2009, 2014; O’Hara 2012; Keulen 2014). On the
other hand, if we take a historical perspective, the clear, explicit and enthusiastically
received influence of management and managers on the western public sector is visible
only from the 1980s onward, a development that should be linked to the failure of
traditional politics to battle the crisis of the welfare state and economy of the 1970s
(Kroeze and Keulen 2012). This is supported by political scientists (Bevir and Rhodes
2006; Bevir 2012) and public administration scientists (Pollitt 1993; Pollitt and Bouckaert
2011; Hood 2005) who have argued that the shift from government to governance and the
rise of New Public Management (NPM) had a great impact on the public sector, an impact
that is still underestimated. Thus, in this article we are trying to add a chapter to the history
of management by describing management in the 1980s and 1990s both as an independent
force – with a longer history of its own – and as a set of ideas and practices influenced by a
time-bounded cultural, economic and political context.
Our method is based on ‘traditional’ source criticism and the interpretative reading of
primary sources (interviews, parliamentary minutes, policy texts) and literature. We also
incorporate insights regarding ‘the linguistic turn’ in our analysis, especially the notion
that language is more than only a descriptive tool. This means that we link up with recent
developments in the field of historically orientated management and organization studies.
Although not much has been written about the recent development of management thought
and practices, the contribution of this historical shift lies on the level of understanding
history writing. As a result, management is no longer regarded as only a neutral, objective
description or simple analytical tool. It is a discourse, a narrative or linguistic action with
performative power, especially for managers, consultants, gurus and firms. Thus, our
article goes beyond the traditional empiricist stance and fits well into the growing
enthusiasm for a cultural-theory-informed ‘historic turn’ in management studies (Clark
and Rowlinson 2004; Booth and Rowlinson 2006; Jacques 2006; Keulen and Kroeze 2012;
Kroeze and Keulen 2013; Bucheli and Wadhani 2014).
Finally, the fact that a change in political leadership styles helps us to understand
management change needs some explanation. Originally, the word ‘leader’ is derived from
the word ‘to lead’, which means guiding people, but leadership is also about being
perceived as a leader by an audience (press, voters, employees). To put it differently, the
style of a popular leader can be regarded as the embodiment of good leadership in a certain
historical context (te Velde 2002; Kets de Vries 2004). Moreover, changes in popularity
are changes in style that have a profound impact on substance. The philosopher of history
Frank Ankersmit has clarified this with the example of the language used by the new
political managers of the 1980s, such as Ruud Lubbers. Lubbers was famous for his
managerial-technical speeches, which he used to get support for his controversial reform
policy. ‘With his speech (form) he [Lubbers] tries to avoid sharpness and precision – and
thus political questions (substance); which without sharpness and precision cannot be
articulated’ (Ankersmit 1997, 165). Therefore, a new ‘political content and new issues on
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the political agenda were, in point of fact a spin-off from changes in political style’, as
Ankersmit (1996, 159) states. However, leaders cannot choose every style that they want
because they are bound by their context, like every historical actor (Pocock 2009). In order
to be successful, they balance between past experiences – forms of acceptable politics –
and new ideas and practices that they present as future possibilities (Koselleck 2004).
Political rhetoric is a means to try and get a grip on, and change, political reality. Thus,
political expressions not only describe reality, they are also performative utterances that
reform reality (Palonen 2003). In other words, a change in political language and
leadership style is related to a change in policy.
In this article, we will first discuss the rise of managers in Western politics and its
effect on the substance of politics and public management. We then focus more
specifically on the change of management itself, in order to show the popularization and
individualization of management from the late 1970s onward. In the third and fourth
sections, we use an example from Dutch politics, plus some international examples, to
present a clearer picture of the change of management by paying attention to the role of
business leaders and the use of the concept of management in politics. With the example of
Dutch environmental policy reform, we try to demonstrate that this new management style
in politics also had its effects on the practices of government. The Dutch case is an
interesting one. The managerial reform of the public sector in general, as well as the
environmental policy reform in particular, received international attention from politicians
and management scholars. In addition, in the Netherlands a particularly fierce political
debate took place about the dominance of management and managers in politics. This
discussion will be the subject of the final sections, together with an argument for why
management lost popularity after 2000.
The rise of the manager in the West
In the UK and the USA, but also in, for example Germany and Denmark (Rennison 2007),
management became the new political narrative of the 1980s. Politicians styled themselves
accordingly. President Ronald Reagan of the USA (1981–1989), who according to the
political historianGil Troy (2005) ‘invented the eighties’ was known for his ‘CEO approach
to the Oval Office’, while German chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982–1998) and UK Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990) were both called ‘the manager’ (Clemens 1994;
Sherwood 1991; Troy 2005, 322). The Belgian Prime Minister of the 1980s Wilfried
Martens noted that those leaders admired each other and shared the same style (cited in
Joustra and vanVenetie¨ 1989, 275). Even in France, under the short-lived cabinet of Jacques
Chirac (1986–1988), new ministers were appointed who felt an affiliation with their
European colleagues and presented themselves as managers (Stevens 2003, 21). The new
style of governing had its effects on the policymaking process and on governmental
procedures, which started to emulate private-sector management (Savoie 1996).
The change of substance becomes clear when we look at language use. These
managers broke down old concepts; they criticized the collective by applauding the merits
of the individual. They fiercely attacked concepts such as society, communism and class,
with Thatcher being the most extreme in this respect. In a party rally for the upcoming
election of 1979, which was to make her Prime Minister, Thatcher called the manager’s
narrative a form of ‘idealism’:
Labour believes that wealth is created by investing in ideology. We know that it’s created by
people putting their own ideas to the test, putting your trust in people, in their originality and
resourcefulness, is not just common sense. It’s a form of idealism in itself. (Thatcher 1979)
396 R. Kroeze and S. Keulen
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Speech acts like these (Austin 1976) quickly altered the substance of politics and
government. After decades of increasing state interference in Western societies, it was
now privatization, liberalization, public cost-cutting actions and deregulation that became
the new norm (Mazower 1998). Management played a formative role in concretizing the
change, as Michael Heseltine, the English Secretary of State for Environment, illustrated
when in 1980 he claimed that ‘[e]fficient management is a key to the [national] revival . . . .
And the management ethos must run right through our national life’ (Pollitt 1993, 3).
Heseltine was not alone in his view that management brought renewal. The Danish
Ministry of Finance, for example, stated in 1983: ‘Management fosters renewal and
inspires the employees to make an efficient and quality-conscious effort’ (Rennison 2007,
19). The Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1984–1993), as well as Thatcher and
Reagan, used the growing attention for management by connecting it to the perceived
crises in party politics (extreme polarization) and welfare state (government overload).
Management would be the depoliticized solution to battle the crisis (Hay 2007, 98–112;
Savoie 1996).
This created the belief that businessmen and chief executive officers (CEOs), who
were regarded as non-political experts in management, had the ability to create progress.
Thatcher used a group of CEOs, soon nicknamed ‘Mrs. Thatcher’s favourite
businessmen’, to privatize state companies (The Guardian, November 22, 2000).
In 1982, Reagan went even further by giving the Grace Committee carte blanche to find
cost-cutting options. Eighty per cent of the committee members were CEOs, who justified
themselves by stating that they were, in their own words, ‘individuals who had a proven
ability to effectively and efficiently manage their own enterprises’ (Harriss 1985, 27–28).
During the official installation ceremony of the committee, Reagan encouraged the men to
‘be bold. We want your team to work like tireless bloodhounds. Don’t leave any stone
unturned in your search to root out inefficiency’ (Reagan 1982). Never before had so much
trust been placed in the hands of leading business managers.
The adoption of management and the influence of managers had far-reaching effects.
When in 1987, two public administration scientists carried out one of the first comparative
inquiries into changes in European public administration, they concluded: ‘Politicians
have taken up a new interest in so-called management solutions. The call for management
and managers has slowly penetrated public administration itself’ (Kooiman and Eliassen
1987, 1). At the end of the 1980s, both Western European and Anglo-Saxon countries
shared this new administrative doctrine (Kickert 1997), which was ‘a popularized mixture
of management theories, business-motivation psychology and neo-liberal economy’
and was soon nicknamed New Public Management (NPM) by Christopher Hood
(Lynn 2006, 106).
The popularization and individualization of management
To the managers in politics, management was a crucial concept. If you denounced the role
of the collective and appraised the individual in seemingly non-ideological and therefore
rational and objective terms, management was a logical choice (Keat and Abercrombie
1991; Pollitt 1993). Management was able to play this role because the nature of the genre
had changed. In the 1970s, management transformed itself from a steering mechanism
focusing on the structure of an organization and running the collective through uniformity
(e.g. through Taylor-inspired methods) into a concept that stressed individuals’ ability to
successfully change an organization or their private lives (Crainer 2000). In other words,
to initiate change and be successful, one first of all needed to be or have the right manager.
Management & Organizational History 397
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This made the manager more than only a guide, boss or expert in a certain management
field. Mintzberg’s famous book The Nature of Managerial Work (1973) is one of the first
examples of this change. He explained that the role of the manager was to lead, motivate
and make decisions, and so become a ‘figurehead’ with ‘duties of ceremonial nature’
(Mintzberg 1975, 54) – just like a politician.
This was taken a step further in the 1980s when a ‘corporate culture boom’ (Rowlinson
and Procter 1999, 371) stressed the role of culture, symbols, language and rituals in
organizations, and emphasized the importance of the role of the individual leader in a
management process (e.g. Deal and Kennedy 1982; Schein 1985). It was a reaction to the
management methods that the Japanese used to successfully compete on the Western
markets with cheap goods. Pascale and Athos argued in 1981 that the art of Japanese
management lay in the attention to the soft skills, which they had laid down in their 7S
framework of Strategy, Systems, Structure, Skills, Style, and Staff which are connected by
Shared values. Their McKinsey colleagues Tom Peters and Robert Waterman (1982) made
this model famous by linking it to the practices of excellent American companies in their
book In Search of Excellence, which became the overall bestselling title in the USA that
year. Now management had changed from a calculating science to a personal art in which
the manager was the ‘change master’ (Kanter 1983).
Soon after this, management became a leading theme in Western popular culture
(Rhodes and Westwood 2008; Rhodes and Lilley 2012). In the USA, management
literature produced the overall bestsellers of 1980, 1982, 1984 and 1985, selling millions
of copies, mainly the work of a small group of management gurus such as Peters and
Waterman (Huczynski 1993). Publishers Weekly concluded in 1983 that ‘Dieting, sex,
whimsy, food and gossip are no longer first in the heart of bibliophiles. With no near
competitors, business was the strongest selling subject in the United States in 1983’
(Huczynski 1993, 35). This success was matched by a growing number of business-
themed movies in the 1980s (Williamson 1991), such asWall Street (1987), that portrayed
business and management as glamorous and made some immoral elements of modern
capitalism an acceptable part of management – ‘greed is good’. In advertising, the ‘new
American hero’ was no longer the idealized soldier or sportsman: perfumes of the 1980s
were sold via images of the young, smart executive in a tailored suit working in Wall
Street (Branchick and Brooks 2013).
Another element of the popularization and individualization of management was top
managers such as Donald Trump and Lee Iacocca becoming the new celebrities of the
1980s. They appeared in business and newspaper gossip columns, and so helped to raise
the sales of their books and of the genre of autobiographies of managers in general (van
Dijk, Kamp, and Rensen 1985; Pie¨t 1987). Many autobiographies turned into
blockbusters. Chrysler CEO Lee Iacocca, for example, sold more than 2.5 million copies
of his Iacocca: An Autobiography, making it the overall bestseller of both 1984 and
1985 (Huczynski 1993). One of the reasons for Iacocca’s popularity was his connection
with the Zeitgeist (Førland 2008, Keulen, and Kroeze 2012). The Economist saw Iacocca
as ‘a man of his time . . . a modern American hero’ (Iacocca 1985, i). More importantly,
American politicians and Iacocca’s co-workers saw a striking resemblance between the
Chrysler CEO and American president Ronald Reagan. ‘Reagan and Lee are similar,’
stated Health Secretary Joseph Califano. Chrysler director Wendell Larsen added:
‘Some of the things Lee has tapped into are the same as Reagan. . . . The nation has
been looking for a leader who is sure of himself’ (Time Magazine, April 1, 1985). And
Reagan did indeed use the same tone and message in his speeches – ‘Reagan’s
storyline’ as Troy (2005, 12) puts it. In 1984, thanks to the popularity of businessmen,
398 R. Kroeze and S. Keulen
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three-quarters of the American population believed that business leaders made real
contributions to society (Troy 2005, 216).
In Europe, books by American management gurus were quickly translated and sold in
large quantities. European CEOWisse Dekker (Overkleeft and Groosman 1988), president
director of Philips Electronics and vice chairman of the European Round Table of
Industrialists (ERT), published his own autobiography and became the most interviewed
business leader in Europe. Royal Dutch Shell president Gerrit Wagner (1982, 1989) added
his personal views to popular management theories, which made American management
recognizable in a national context. The popularity of management had a considerable
effect on the organization of government. In the Netherlands, for example, the Interior
Ministry propagated In Search of Excellence as having an ‘undeniable practical value’,
and saw great uses for it in realizing the political goals of the Lubbers government
(Buurma 1986, 74). This feeling was shared by secretary general of the Public Housing
Department Wolter Lemstra (1988), who edited the first Dutch government management
handbook. The book celebrated the management concepts and ideas, popular at the time,
of Peters and Waterman (1982), Deal and Kennedy (1982), Pascale and Athos (1981),
Mintzberg (1979) and Porter (1985).
The Netherlands was not the only European country where management caught on in
popular culture. In the UK, former Imperial Chemical Industries chairman Charles
Harvey-Jones had become a household name as host of the BBC television show
Troubleshooter, and introduced an audience of millions to the basics of management
(The Guardian, January 11, 2008). His Swedish colleague Scandinavian airlines chairman
Jan Carlzon had a great influence on the thinking about management in Sweden, and even
achieved guru status in the USA with his book Moments of Truth (Carlzon 1987).
The popularity of management stimulated politicians to openly fashion themselves as
managers, to applaud (business) management practices and to place their trust in
management. Moreover, management became managerialism. In 1993, political scientist
Pollitt provided a definition of the two concepts that reflects the spirit of the time:
Management is a set of beliefs and practices, at the core of which burns the seldom-tested
assumption that better management will prove an effective solvent for a wide range of
economic and social ills. . . . Managerialism appears an optimistic, almost a romantic creed.
For it suggests that solutions lie within our own hands, that determined, clear-sighted
leadership can achieve fundamental changes and can give a new sense of purpose and
achievement. (Pollitt 1993, 1)
Now, just like a political ideology, management was ‘concern[ed with] social groups and
social arrangements’ and the distribution of (state) resources, and it ‘privileges certain
groups’ (managers) by marginalizing others (e.g. old-fashioned bureaucrats). Most
importantly, management created coherence – the ‘socially-derived link between the
individual and the group’ (Pollitt 1993, 6–10). Through management, business and
government, politicians and voters felt connected with each other and were able to
overcome the crises and polarization of the 1970s.
The effects (1): introducing management into politics
By analyzing the Dutch case in more detail, we can see how management was introduced
into politics and how radical its consequences proved to be. In the Netherlands, Ruud
Lubbers of the Christian Democratic Party (Christen-Democratisch Appe`l, CDA) became
Prime Minister in 1982. He headed three coalition cabinets, was called ‘manager in
politics’, and was the face of politics in the 1980s and early 1990s because he remained in
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office for 12 years: a record in Dutch political history. At the high point of the 1980s
recession, with unemployment rates at 13%, Lubbers articulated a government policy
whose primary goal was to reduce the government deficit via deregulation and
privatization. The cabinet reduced the number of civil servants and lowered the salaries of
civil servants and teachers and social security benefits by 3%. Thatcher, at that time herself
battling the trade unions, envied Lubbers for the relatively quick acceptance of his harsh
measures to reform the public sector. Traditionally, it is argued that this ease is the result of
a historical agreement between the employers’ associations and the unions in 1982: the
‘Wassenaar agreement’. Although this pact is important, placing too much emphasis on it
ignores a bigger underlying change: the entrance of management and business managers in
politics.
Only six years before Lubbers took office, business leaders had felt deeply discredited by
the politics of Joop den Uyl of Labor (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), who was prime minister
of a left-wing government between 1973 and 1977. On 9 December 1976, nine top managers
of the largest Dutch industries wrote an open letter to the government and Parliament. In this
letter, they pleaded for ‘a radical improvement of the business environment through a
positive attitude towards entrepreneurial Holland’ and the relinquishing of ‘what in our eyes
is a one-sided and dogmatic vision – the aspiration of societal renewal [maatschappij-
vernieuwing ] through collective democratization’. The liberal newspaper NRCHandelsblad
concluded that it was ‘hardly common for individual managers in this country to publicly
present their opinions on matters of general politics’. Others felt offended. B. de Gaay
Fortman, the chairman of the Radicals (Politieke Partij Radikalen, PPR), a cabinet party,
called the letter ‘a conscious attempt to kill this government’ (NRC Handelsblad, January
13, 1976). In 1976, left-wing parties were still very popular in the Netherlands, but around
1980 the failure of Den Uyl’s Keynesian economic program to conquer the economic crisis
of the late 1970s proved to be a fertile breeding ground for change. In 1981, five years after
the letter by the nine industrialists, the new right-wing government of Christian Democrats
and Liberals (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) asked G. A. Wagner,
chairman of the Board at Shell, to write a report on the industrial climate in the Netherlands.
This report, ‘A new industrial elan’, which echoed the beliefs and optimism of Reagan and
In search of excellence, was almost integrally copied in Lubbers’s policy statement
(regeringsverklaring) when he took office in 1982.
The Wagner committee was the start of a new trend of establishing committees led by
CEOs to advise on policies that had been in a deadlock for years. The establishment of
CEO committees is a striking example of a speech act, because it shows how talking about
business and management resulted in political change. In the two decades after Wagner,
the government installed at least 31 committees headed by a CEO or former CEO.
Provinces and cities emulated this trend by setting up ‘their own Wagner Committees’
consisting of local businessmen (Molema 2011, 274). A good example is the committee
appointed to devise a new structure for, and carry out a cost-cutting operation on, the
Dutch healthcare system, a topic that had been debated for years. In 1987, Prime Minister
Lubbers himself phoned Wisse Dekker, chairman of the Board at Philips, to ask him to
chair this committee because of his ‘business attitude’ that ‘would lead to quick results’
(Dekker in Keulen and Kroeze 2011, 88, 89). In the same year, Dekker was also asked to
chair a committee for the minister of Economic Affairs. But it was not only cabinet
members who were keen on businessmen; the same was true for Parliament. A year before
the Dekker report was finished, Parliament requested a committee to be set up to devise a
new and ‘simple’ tax plan. In order to find such a simple solution, the committee had to be
chaired by a non-politician (NRC Handelsblad, July 20, 1991). The Committee-Van Oort,
400 R. Kroeze and S. Keulen
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named after the head of the Amro Bank, delivered what was wanted with their report
‘Sight on Simplicity’ [Zicht op Eenvoud] (Table 1).
Lubbers, himself a former director of a private company, was keen to appoint as many
business leaders in his cabinet as possible. Of a total of 14 ministers, he appointed three
former managers, one member of several supervisory boards of banks and insurance
companies, and no less than seven directors from private companies (PDC archive). They
were managers not only in name, but also in speech. In parliamentary debates, the use of
the terms ‘management’ and ‘manager’ rapidly rose during the 1980s and peaked in the
1990s. Moreover, these ministers did not refer to the Netherlands as a state or society, but
as a company: ‘The Netherlands Inc.’ (BV Nederland). This term was first coined in a
parliamentary debate in 1982 and would from then on become common in political
language (Handelingen II [Records of the Dutch House of Representatives] 1981–1982,
2398). These managers stressed that The Netherlands Inc. had a budget deficit that could
be solved by rational ‘no-nonsense’ policies (Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 214) (Table 2).
An important act of the right-wing Lubbers cabinets was the restructuring of the
government’s deficit by massive cost-cutting and privatization. Although the Netherlands
had the largest public sector after Sweden, cost-cutting and privatization operations
went through without too much protest from political parties and with only one large strike
by trade unions, in 1983. By calling their policies ‘no nonsense’, the ministers of the
Lubbers cabinets emphasized the rationality and necessity of their acts, but also disguised
the ideological arguments of their actions (Lubbers 1995). In 1991, however, the
political scientist Gladdish concluded that the Lubbers cabinets were highly ideological
because they represented ‘a new inflection in the direction of public policy which could
Table 1. Number of committees chaired by a business leader installed by the government.
Period Number
1980–1985 1
1985–1990 3
1990–1995 3
1995–2000 4
2000–2005 11
2005–2010 10
Sources: NRC Handelsblad, Trouw, Het Financieele Dagblad, de Volkskrant 1980–2010.
Table 2. Number of debates (N) in which the terms ‘management’ and ‘manager’ were used in a
parliamentary year 1965–2005 and frequency of use (F).
Parliamentary Year Management (N) Management (F) Manager (N) Manager (F)
1965–1966 1 6 1 3
1970–1971 16 41 2 5
1975–1976 20 57 3 5
1980–1981 24 66 3 2
1985–1986 35 228 4 13
1990–1991 44 193 7 10
1995–1996 82 328 19 24
2000–2001 73 159 11 19
2005–2006 47 128 11 15
Sources: Number of debates: Digitalized Minutes of Parliament; Frequency of term usage per calendar year:
ngram.politicalmashup.nl.
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conform to the notion of a “neo-liberal backlash” against the tentacles of the state’
(Gladdish 1991, 157, 158). It showed the newness of Lubbers’s political management
style, which was only recognized and framed in ‘neoliberal’ terms nine years after he had
entered office.
Management made the difference between government and business disappear.
The non-executive director of several financial companies who became the Dutch minister
of Transport in 1982, the Liberal Neelie Kroes, saw no difference between working in the
business sector and in a democratically legitimized political system. She stated that ‘the
nature of our work shouldn’t be different. Every leader in the business sector just has to
deal with society in the same way as we do. They have to keep their business going, just
as we have to keep the Netherlands Inc. going’ (NRC Handelsblad, April 14, 1985).
Her colleague, the Liberal minister of Environment Pieter Winsemius, a former McKinsey
consultant, introduced new management practices and stated that the aim of these
practices was to improve Dutch democracy as well. When he left office in 1986, his
farewell present to his former colleagues was a management book on environmental
policy, Guest in our own house, based on the 7S framework of In search of Excellence.
The preface of Winsemius’s book was written by Lubbers, which showed the far-reaching
influence of management in politics. Lubbers describedWinsemius’s management not as a
tool but as a ‘political-cultural vision’ (Lubbers 1986).
Elco Brinkman, the Christian Democratic minister of Welfare, Culture and Sport
from 1982 until 1989, supported Winsemius’s vision. In 1982, he was given charge of a
newly merged ministry of Welfare, Culture and Sports. This merger, influenced by the
newest management ideas and headed by secretary generals who had done internships at
large Dutch firms, was the end of the ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work
(Lemstra in Keulen and Kroeze 2011, 105, 106). It was especially the directors of the
Social Work departments, one of the symbols of the welfare state, who saw this new
ministry as a deliberate termination of old lines of thought and forms (Zandbergen 1989).
Brinkman admitted that he was not very interested in welfare and saw himself first and
foremost as a manager. ‘Ministers are actually managers at their departments, and they see
themselves as such’ (Brinkman in Keulen and Kroeze 2011, 49). The merger introduced
business principles such as core competencies (Hamel and Prahalad 1990) into the
ministry (van Bottenburg 2002), and in this way Brinkman hoped to tackle
‘overproduction’ in the subsidized arts by focusing on ‘quality’ and employing
‘professional art managers’ to lead this process (Martinius 1990, 83). After 1989,
when Brinkman became parliamentary leader of the Christian Democrats, he saw the
‘management jargon’ as a way to internally improve public administration and to
strengthen democracy. In 1992, in a famous speech, Brinkman went even further than
Lubbers in promoting management:
Not all government departments are led in a modern way as yet: more attention is needed for
the product, the “hard core” of the organization, to put it in management jargon. If we want to
strengthen the effectiveness of government we should no longer add things, but take things
away. (Brinkman 1992)
The effects (2): managing the environment
How changes in style and language can change substance is clearly reflected in the case of
Dutch environmental policy reform. Just as in the USA and the UK, the Lubbers cabinets
wanted to reduce government by privatization and deregulation (Kickert 1997).
Environment was an attractive target for deregulation. Winsemius, the minister for the
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Environment in the first Lubbers cabinet, was seen by the press as ‘the embodiment of the
Lubbers cabinet’ (van Tijn and van Weezel 1986, 58), because he was a former partner at
McKinsey and loved to talk about management. He was distrusted by opposition parties
because he was the first environmental minister without an academic background in that
field, and without ties to the environmental movement (Keulen 2014, 180).
His last job for McKinsey was to deliver an advice on environmental deregulation to
the business sector, which he presented at the yearly conference of the Confederation of
Netherlands Industry and Employers (Vereniging Nederlandse Ondernemingen, VNO).
As a solution, he suggested the Bubble Concept (Winsemius and Gledens 1982). This
concept, introduced by former McKinsey adviser William Drayton, was presented in The
Harvard Business Review (Drayton 1981) and Mc Kinsey Quarterly (Clark 1981) as the
first form of emission trade. The basic assumption was simple: ‘Controlled trading will
give the manager back the flexibility to find the best way of getting the job done that
regulation took away’ (Drayton 1981, 38). In the USA, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) adopted the Bubble policy; it was one of the first pieces of legislation that
Reagan signed. Denmark implemented a Bubble policy in 1984 for the country’s largest
group of air polluters, the power stations (Wallace 1995).
Deregulation meant a break with the Dutch environmental policy practiced at the time,
which was based on strict regulation: every company needed a permit for every source of
pollution. Theministry of Environment was established in 1971 after the Club of Rome had
presented The limits to growth (Meadows 1971). It shocked the world, and certainly the
Netherlands: half of all the copies worldwide were sold in the Netherlands alone (Cramer
1989, 36). The civil servants of the newly formed ministry were convinced that they could
effectively conquer pollution within 10 years. In their hurry, they were not concerned about
the proliferation of different laws. In the second half of the 1970s, however, it became clear
that the Netherlands would not be clean in the 1980s and that several laws were
counterproductive (Siraa, van der Valk, and Wissink 1995). Civil servants felt that they
were victims of the ‘Law of Continued Gloom’ (De Koning 1994, 73, 74).
Winsemius inherited a depressed department. His civil servants were not enthusiastic
about the Bubble Concept, which Winsemius had presented on his first day (DGM 1982a):
I heard about the Law of Continued Gloom three times during my first week and then said
“Don’t mention that any more in my hearing!” It makes you sick, unwell. Real defeatism . . . .
I seem to be a true Maslow follower. I got the ideas from the Stanford Business School’ (Hajer
1997, 187)
One of Winsemius’s first actions to create enthusiasm was the introduction of
In Search of Excellence with its optimistic message, and the then popular 7S framework
(Hajer 1997, 187). Next, from Philips president Wisse Dekker he took the concept of
‘management by speech’ to spread his message and establish ‘the desired team spirit’ at
his department (Huys 1986, 32). Moreover, he introduced the Philips ‘target-group
management’ approach, a tool to provide different target groups with their own message
(DGM 1982b; Philips 1979).
Soon after that, he organized a strategy session with the department managers to set out
the long-term policy goals (DGM 1982c). Like a consultant, he made his management fill
in their goals in matrices. Next, he used the ‘regulatory chain’ based on the PDCA or
Deming circles of Total Quality Management, in which he changed Plan, Do, Check, Act
(PDCA) to Lawmaking, Licensing, Implementation, Enforcement. He used this for one of
his first policy plans: the Integration of Environmental Planning Project, which was hailed
in parliament for its ‘clear insights’, even by the largest opposition party, Labor
(Handelingen II 1982–1983 18,010; 1984–1985 UCV 53–6).
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His management-by-speech approach was not limited to the Netherlands. In April
1984, Winsemius was invited to give talks for the EPA, and at a series of dinners of
American industrialists. In those keynotes, he introduced the ‘policy life cycle’. This was a
model, Winsemius (1984) argued, that provided ‘a relevant insight into the probable
development of a specific policy and the requirements that policy makers have to meet
with respect to the so-called “policy parameters”’. The policy life cycle showed how in
every phase of the process, you could manage your policy to reduce the political upheaval
to a minimum. The model was derived from the Product Life Cycle, used by corporations
to evaluate their product portfolio by establishing the life phases of each product: market
development, expansion, maturity, decline (Levitt 1965). The Boston Consultancy
Group (BCG) had reworked Levitt’s model and had been exporting it as the BCG matrix
since 1979.
Once back in the Netherlands, persuaded by his former McKinsey colleagues and the
success of Peters and Waterman, Winsemius decided to write a management book based on
the 7S framework and his Policy life cycle (De Koning 1994, 113–115; Winsemius 1986,
1990). He also used those concepts as foundation for his Five Year Integrated Environmental
Policy Plan (IMP). This was the most important policy plan of his ministerial period, even
though his director general expressed serious doubts: he thought the policy life cycle was too
closely related to industrial production processes. The IMP combined all Winsemius’s
management insights (DGM 1984a, 1984b). Environmental pollution would be reduced by
using the Philips target-group management approach to identify the largest polluters
(refineries, power stations and agriculture). Not legislation, but voluntary agreements, or
convenants (covenants), would be the way to reduce pollution. For the implementation of the
rest of the plan, his civil servants suggested 56 priorities. Winsemius was upset: ‘too many:
no outsider can assess this’ (DGM 1984c). He single-handedly revised their draft and came
up with five priority areas, although he was not satisfied with the highly technical names for
priorities such as ‘eutrophication’ or ‘chemisation’ (DGM 1984d). He therefore developed
simple concepts: ‘We created a few newwords (verstoring, vermesting) and suddenly people
started to see the interrelations . . . All words had to start with “ver” [“too”] to indicate too
much, too fat, too far’ (Hajer 1997, 188). Again, Winsemius’s consultancy background was
clearly visible. He took successful management concepts as examples whose names and
acronyms were easy to remember, such as SWOT, Porters 5 Forces, 6 Sigma, 7S framework
and Senge’s fifth discipline (Karsten and van Veen 1998). His policy had an equivalent: five
‘Ver’ priorities.
Parliament was impressed. The governing parties, Christian Democrats and Liberals,
praised Winsemius, because in the words of Liberal MP Jan Te Veldhuis: ‘The hand of
Winsemius the consultant is clearly reflected in Winsemius the minister. In 1984 he offered
this House the “regulatory chain”, and now, in 1985, the IMP, which is a mixture of a
consultancy and a communications plan’ (Handelingen II 1984–1985, 954). Even the
opposition, headed by Labor, saw Winsemius as a ‘good minister’. He was ‘fun and
fashionable, sometimes very serious, but always self-restrained’ and his management-by-
speech generatedmuch publicity for environmental issues (Handelingen II 1985–1986, 968).
Although Winsemius left office in 1986, the effects of his managerial reform of
environmental policy were long-lasting. His five ‘Ver’ priorities remained in use for
13 years until 1998, and inspired all subsequent Labor ministers who were in charge of the
Ministry of Environment from 1989 until 2002. The Labor ministers especially liked
the target-group management approach, copied from Philips, which Winsemius had
introduced. A second instrument for deregulation that Winsemius had introduced, the
voluntary agreements, or covenants, also gained large support. As a result, the number of
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covenants grew rapidly from 52 in the period from 1982–1993 to over 100 in 1998.
During this period the Minister of Environment Hans Alders (PvdA 1989–1994) signed
three times more convenants than his two predecessors combined, which earned him the
nickname ‘Hans Convenant’ (NRC Handelsblad, April 27, 1990). This form of
deregulation was viewed as the ‘green polder model’ and actively promoted within Europe
by the ‘Purple coalition’, which succeeded Lubbers’s last cabinet in 1994 (Glasbergen
1998). The Netherlands changed from a laggard in environmental policy in the 1970s to
front runner in the late 1980s, and was an exporter of management-based policy
instruments in the 1990s (Zito et al. 2003; Liefferink 1997). The target-group model was
taken over as a policy instrument by the EU in 1993 (EU 1993), and covenants followed in
1996 when the European Committee advised member states to use this instrument to meet
the new European regulations (EC 1996a, 1996b).
Management at a turning point?
In 1994, Ruud Lubbers left politics and Wim Kok, the Labor leader and former trade union
leader, became Prime Minister of the Purple Coalition (1994–2002). This coalition was
named after the mix of political colors: the social democratic red of Labor and blue of
the Liberals, with a bit of green from the Liberal Democrats (Democraten 66, D66).
The retirement of Lubbers, the appointment of a social democrat as Prime Minister, and a
coalition government of left and right and without Christian Democrats did not end the
managers’ moment in politics. The first Purple cabinet was nicknamed ‘Lubbers IV
without Lubbers’ (Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 112). Already in 1986, when Kok had
succeeded former Prime Minister Den Uyl as Labor leader, he decided, in order to regain
power, to change from a social democratic ‘ideological to more pragmatic’ style of politics
(Klein and Kooistra 1998, 115–118). In the first year of his cabinet, Kok held a famous
party speech in which he stated that socialism needed to ‘shake off its ideological feathers’
(Keulen and Kroeze 2010; Kok 2009). This statement initiated a transformation that
helped to strengthen the image of managerial politics in the 1990s as pragmatic, non-
ideological and popular. Shortly after that, purple politics, which lasted until 2002, was
qualified as governing a ‘managerial state’ (e.g. by de Vries 2002, who derived this term
from Clarke and Newman 1997).
Prime Minister Kok maintained warm contacts with business CEOs such as Cees van
der Hoeven (Ahold) and Jan Timmer (Philips), who advised him to act as ‘polder
manager’. Also, purple ministers introduced ‘Captain of Industry seminars’. During one
of these seminars, retail CEOs advised the minister of Agriculture to handle the 1996
BSE crisis as a ‘product recall’ (de Vries 2002, 79). Moreover, like Lubbers, Kok was
admired abroad for his policy, which coincided with an annual economic growth of 4%
and the lowest inflation and unemployment rates in Europe at that time. Labor parties,
journalists and politicians abroad regarded the Dutch success of the 1990s as the result of
Kok’s policy, a specific form of ‘third way’ politics – between classical socialism and
economic liberalism. Bill Clinton, Gerhard Schro¨der and Tony Blair asked Kok to
explain the new ‘Dutch miracle’ and the accompanying polder management model (de
Rooy and te Velde 2005, 137, 188). In the words of chancellor Schro¨der (2009, 372),
‘the “polder model” and the “agreement of Wassenaar” of Wim Kok . . . and the Partij
van de Arbeid [Labor] is a success story which is studied with great attention all over
Europe’.
Management in politics was brought to perfection in the 1990s, for example by former
Shell manager Frits Bolkestein, the leader of the Liberals, the most important coalition
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partner of Kok’s Labor party. He introduced the ‘Bolkestein doctrine’, according to
which the cabinet should be run as a management team: after one term, cabinet posts
should be rotated to prevent the identification of ministers with their own department
(ANP, May 8, 1996). As a result, during the second purple cabinet, almost every minister
was ‘reshuffled’. Another example concerns parliamentarians: they, too, wanted to
become managers. They got the chance in 1994 when the Confederation of Netherlands
Industry and Employers introduced an exchange program in which every MP was linked to
a business manager. The program was popular: in 1996 more than half of all MPs
participated (Forum 1996; Jorritsma-Lebbink in Keulen and Kroeze 2011, 50).
In addition, chairmen of political parties took their inspiration from business to renew
the party. They no longer needed ‘the hard hand of the old party barons, but the new
streamlined technique of a modern manager’ (Verkuil 1992, 9). The Christian Democrats
were the first party to change when they appointedWim van Velzen as chairman in 1987, a
position he would hold until 1994. Van Velzen was chosen for his ‘management abilities’
and ordered to set up a ‘modern HR section’, in which recruitment was chiefly based on
professionalism, not on party loyalty (Trouw, March 8, 1994; NRC Handelsblad, March 9,
1994). The PvdA had Felix Rottenberg as chairman (1992–1997). As a modern crisis
manager, he had to overhaul his party: ‘I saw myself as a captain of a change operation,
with an open end. With a few clearly visible dots on the horizon. I had no “ready to hand”
building plan’ (Rottenberg in Keulen and Kroeze 2011, 52). Rottenberg concentrated on
introducing new practices instead of ideological refinement. He presented new recruitment
methods and modern ways to communicate with the members. Not the party convention,
but spreading information by fax, briefings and ‘knowledge festivals’ became the primary
party activity (de Beus 2000, 175). In 1996, the Liberal Democrats followed the examples
of the Christian Democrats and Labor with the appointment of Tom Kok, who combined
his function of party chairman with a seat on the board of the Achmea insurance company.
He introduced corporate sponsorship for the annual party conventions (NRC Handelsblad,
November 25, 1996; Elsevier, October 23, 1999).
The logical next step was to ask top managers to write the election programs. This
happened from 1994 onwards, and was possible because Dutch CEOs collectively felt
completely free to air their party preferences (NRC Handelsblad, April 23, 1994). In the
campaign for the national elections of 1998, CEOs and politicians even held an election
debate in a packed Ridderzaal building, the ‘fulcrum of Dutch politics’ (Het Financieele
Dagblad, April 23, 1998). In 1994, the General Elderly Alliance (Algemeen Ouderen
Verbond, AOV) became the first party with a programwritten by a CEO,when they entrusted
the job to former steel magnate RonMeijer. In the same election year, Dutch Telecom (KPN)
CEOWim Dik assisted the Liberal Democrats during the elections. In 2001, the program of
the Liberals was written by Pieter Korteweg (Robeco asset management), and the Christian
Democrats asked Jan-Michiel Hessels of Dutch retail giant Vendex to write their election
manifesto. In 2006, Ben Verwaayen, then CEO of British Telecom, wrote the election
program of the Liberals. He was the last business manager to do so (NRC Handelsblad,
December 13, 1993; August 1, 1997; Het Financieele Dagblad October 31, 2001; October
18, 2002; December 1, 2005).
However, around 2002, management lost its attraction for several reasons, not all of
them political. First, the management genre itself became dominated by literature written
by anti-guru gurus and debunked by ‘critical studies’ scholars within academia, who
denounced popular management studies as ‘Heathrow literature’ or ‘bullshit’ (Keulen and
Kroeze 2012). Second, after years of reform, the public transport, education and health
management policy had successfully transformed citizens into customers and civil
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servants into public managers, but punctuality and service levels had dropped and prices
increased. NPM, and often management and managers in general, was held responsible.
Third, a series of international fraud cases in 2002 and 2003 (Worldcom, Enron, Ahold and
Parmalat) formed a fertile breeding ground for the idea that business managers and
management policies, now often labeled ‘neoliberalism’, had a dark corrupt side.
In the Netherlands opposition leader Pim Fortuyn was successful with his pleas in
which he combined a critique on the multicultural society with critique on the role of
managers in politics (de Rooy and te Velde 2005). The focus on public cost-cutting,
rationality, efficiency and privatization had created a public sector full of ‘bureaucrats and
managers’, as he called it (Fortuyn 2002, 12). In exchange he asked for ‘entrepreneurship’,
which he clearly distinguished from management (Pels 2004, 121) and morally loaded
politics, combined with a non-pragmatic populist style. His party won the 2002 election,
defeating Labor and the Liberals, something that had long been held impossible because of
the purple coalition’s astonishing economic track record (Aerts 2003).
Fortuyn was not alone in combining populist politics and an entrepreneurial ideal with a
critical stance toward neoliberalism and management. All over Europe, non-pragmatic,
populist, often self-made businessmen such as Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, Christoph Blocher
in Switzerland and Declan Ganley in Ireland were successful in politics. Since that time,
‘bashing’ managers and management has remained popular in European politics and in
business as well (Hoopes 2003; Verbrugge 2004; Carver 2005, Klein 2007, Ankersmit and
Klinkers 2008; Pearson 2009; Napier 2012). This change had its effect on management as
exercised by the government. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) found that NPM had been in
decline since 2000, and that new concepts were no longer based on markets and business
principles.Moreover, inmany new plans, citizenswere no longer considered customers, but
stakeholders in a ‘big society’. At the very least, we can conclude that the enormous
popularity of management, as well as the willingness of politicians to present themselves as
managers, came to an end in the first decade of the newmillennium. The future will have to
show whether this is a definite or a temporary halt to the advance of management, what the
real effects of this change are, and what has come in its place.
Conclusion
Webegan this article by stating that the style of leaders – language, performance and image –
reflects the historical context and is linked to change in a certain time frame. Leaders develop
new styles, but they have to build on past experiences to create a new horizon of expectation.
Hence, the manager’s moment in politics in the 1980s and 1990s was possible because of the
economic crisis of the 1970s and the failure of the old policies to overcome this crisis. The
reason why management was used to initiate change also came from a transformation of
management itself from a systems approach to a more personal approach, which made the
manager the symbolic figurehead of an organization and the master of change. The
individualization of management made it possible for CEOs to become rock stars, and for
their writings to become big hits in popular culture. This helped to make management
concepts and business principles understandable and acceptable to larger parts of society.
The Dutch case shows how far this process went. It was not only ministers and prime
ministers but also civil servants, parliamentarians and chairmen of political parties who
explicitly and purposely presented themselves as managers in politics and were perceived
as such. In addition, our in-depth analysis of the transformation of Dutch environmental
policy indicates that this discursive shift resulted in specific acts that changed the ways that
political organizations worked and policy was formulated.
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After 20 years of success, the managers lost their public attractiveness. In the
Netherlands, Fortuyn was at the forefront in criticizing management and compiling a new
political language based on the experiences with management and managers in politics.
Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship instead of managers and management, value-driven
politics instead of ‘no nonsense’, and ‘emotional’ instead of rationally calculated politics
became popular.
To sum up, in this article we described how the 1980s and 1990s were indeed a special
period in the history of twentieth-century management, and that more attention to the
language and framing of management helps to locate change – not only in form or
rhetoric, but also in substance. This means that if we are to understand changes in the
content of management and the role of managers, it is necessary to be informed by theories
that stress the performativity of management concepts and the manager’s language.
Next, analyzing the use of management outside business will improve our knowledge of
the specific content and impact of management change. Finally, the historical context in
which top managers in business and politics operate both limits and provides opportunities
to establish new managerial ideas and practices. Hence, knowledge of the cultural, societal
and political context is crucial to understand management. All this is important not only
for those interested in the history of contemporary politics, in which managers and
management played such a big role, but also for those dealing with organizational change
and management history, because it helps to understand how the content and impact of
management can differ over time.
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